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Abstract. In this paper we exploit GAA to build a scheme that con-
verts a simple static password authentication mechanism into a one-time
password (OTP) system. The scheme employs a GAA-enabled user de-
vice with a display and an input capability (e.g. a 3G mobile phone)
and a GAA-aware server. Most importantly, the device does not need
to be user or server specific, and can be used in the protocol with no
registration or configuration (except for the installation of the necessary
application software). The system also fits well to the multi-institution
scenario and hence enables the provision of ubiquitous and on-demand
OTP services.
Keywords: One-time password, Generic Authentication Architecture, mo-
bile security
1 Introduction
A one-time password (OTP) is a means of proving the identity of a user in which
a password is only valid for a single authentication session or for a short time
period. On-demand OTP systems (e.g. RFC 4226 [7]) typically involve a user
and server-specific security token that shares a secret key with the server and
that requires an initialisation process. If the token is compromised, lost or stolen,
then an adversary may be able to use it to access the server, at least until it
is revoked. Such schemes do not fit well to the multi-institution scenario, since
a user will be required to possess a token for each server with which the user
interacts. Of course, a multi-institution scheme in which a token is equipped
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with a separate secret key for each of a number of servers is technically feasible;
however, such a scheme may be difficult to deploy and manage in practice. These
disadvantages increase the management burden and cost, and hence limit the
use of OTP systems to security-critical applications.
Molva and Tsudik [6] originally proposed the use of a non-user-specific secu-
rity token (card) for user authentication. The card shares a strong cryptographic
key with an authentication server, and is used solely to provide a secure channel
between a human user and the server. Since the token is not associated with
any particular user, the scheme is resistant to token compromise. However, it
requires every server to generate and securely distribute a key-bearing token to
every user, which is likely to be a significant burden in practice.
To avoid these disadvantages, we exploit the Generic Authentication Archi-
tecture (GAA) [2] to build a scheme that converts a simple static password au-
thentication mechanism into an OTP system. A mobile network which provides
the GAA service plays the role of a Trusted Third Party (TTP). The scheme
employs a GAA-enabled user device with a display and an input capability (e.g.
a 3G mobile phone) and a GAA-aware server. During the user authentication
process, an application-specific session key is bootstrapped between the device
and the server using GAA. The device computes a one-time authenticator as a
function of this bootstrapped key and a long-term secret password shared by the
user and the server. This authenticator is submitted to the server to authenti-
cate the user, instead of the long-term password. The authenticator will be valid
only if it is computed using a valid session key. Thus, limiting the validity of a
session key to a short time period or a single authentication session makes this
a one-time scheme.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we give a brief
introduction of GAA. We describe the GAA-based OTP system in section 3,
and discuss its advantages and limitations in section 4. In section 5 we provide
an informal security analysis, and in section 6 we draw conclusions.
2 Generic Authentication Architecture
The information in this section is mainly derived from Holtmanns et al. [4].
GAA has been standardised by both the 3rd Generation Partnership Project
(3GPP), and its North American counterpart, the 3rd Generation Partner-
ship Project 2 (3GPP2). GAA exploits the UMTS authentication infrastructure
(strictly, the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement (UMTS AKA) proto-
col [1]) to enable the provision of security services, including key establishment,
to third party mobile and Internet applications.
The UMTS AKA protocol provides authentication and key establishment
using a long-term secret subscriber key (K ), shared by a user device (e.g. a 3G
mobile phone) and a mobile network. As a result of a successful UMTS AKA
procedure, a pair of secret session keys is shared by the device and the network.
These keys are CK, used for confidentiality protection, and IK, used for integrity
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protection. We note also that, in the UMTS AKA procedure, a random challenge
(RAND) is sent by the mobile network to the user device.
GAA consists of two procedures, GAA bootstrapping and Use of bootstrapped
keys. GAA bootstrapping, also known as the Generic Bootstrapping Architec-
ture (GBA), is the process by which UMTS AKA is used to set up a GAA master
session key (MK ) between a GAA-enabled device and a network, where MK is
the concatenation of IK and CK . The network also sends a transaction identifier
B-TID1 that can be used to identify MK and its lifetime to the GAA-enabled
device. Both the GAA-enabled device and the network cache MK, the lifetime
of MK and RAND2 for later use. The master session key MK is not bound to a
particular application, and can only be used to derive application-specific session
keys.
Use of bootstrapped keys is the procedure by which a GAA-enabled device
employs the bootstrapped keys to secure its exchanges in an application protocol
with a particular GAA-aware application server. Once the GAA-enabled device
decides to engage in an application protocol with a particular GAA-aware server,
it derives an application-specific session key (SK ) from MK, as follows:
SK = KDF(MK ,GBAvariant,RAND , IMPI,NAF -Id)3
where KDF is a key derivation function. The device starts the application proto-
col by sending a request containing B-TID . The server fetches the same SK, the
lifetime of SK, and other relevant information from the corresponding mobile
network by forwarding the received B-TID and its own identifier NAF-Id.4 At
this point, the device and the server share the same value of SK . It is important
to note that SK is bound to a specific application protocol and a particular
application server.
3 The GAA-based OTP Scheme
As discussed above, GAA builds on UMTS AKA to bootstrap application-
specific session keys between GAA-enabled devices and GAA-aware servers, and
which can be used to establish a secure authenticated channel. In this paper
1 B-TID is generated from the RAND value and the mobile network name.
2 Here and throughout RAND refers to the random challenge sent as part of UMTS
AKA.
3 GBAvariant indicates where to store the bootstrapped keys. In the normal GBA
(GBA ME) case, the bootstrapped keys are stored in the mobile device, and not in
the UMTS Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). The IP Multimedia Private Identifier
(IMPI) is derived from the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [3]. NAF-
Id consists of the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of the intended server and
the identifier of the application protocol.
4 Normally the network has to authenticate that the requesting server is the genuine
owner of FQDN, which forms a part of NAF-Id. In GAA, it is assumed that a secure
authenticated channel between the server and the network has been set up by some
means.
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we combine this secure authenticated channel with a long-term secret password
shared by the user and the server to obtain an OTP scheme.
In the system, the following entities play a role:
– A user U .
– A client (e.g. a browser) C, used by U to access a GAA-aware server.
– A GAA-enabled user device T (e.g. a 3G mobile phone) with a display and
an input capability. T must possess a means of communication with the
client, e.g. as provided by a USB cable or a Bluetooth link. T must also be
equipped with an application supporting the OTP service, which must be
capable of accessing a GAA service.
– A GAA-aware server S .
– A mobile network provider (TTP) that provides the GAA service.
These entities are equipped with a variety of parameters and cryptographic keys.
U is equipped with an identifier username and a password (pw), a weak secret
shared with S . A long-term secret subscriber key (K ) is shared by T (strictly
its USIM) and its home mobile network provider as part of the subscription. We
assume that S has the means to establish an secure authenticated channel (e.g.
as provided by an SSL/TLS tunnel) with TTP as necessary to use GAA.
1. T ↔ TTP : B-TID, MK, RAND
: and the lifetime of MK ([Tstart, Tend]).
2. T : derives a session key SK.
3. T : computes otp = f(SK , pw) and then
: deletes MK, SK, and others values.
4. U(C) → S : B-TID, username, and otp.
5. S ↔ TTP : SK and the lifetime of SK ([Tstart, Tend]).
6. S : Tcurrent ∈ [Tstart, Tend]?
: if so, S recomputes otp for authentication;
: if not, S discards the request.
Figure 1: the OTP protocol
Figure 1 summarises the OTP protocol. We next give a more detailed description,
referring to the step numbers given in the figure.
When U wishes to access S, U directs its client C to S . T triggers a GAA
bootstrapping procedure with its home network (step 1). After successful exe-
cution of this process, the values B-TID, RAND, MK, and the lifetime of MK
([Tstart, Tend]) are shared and cached by T and its home network. The client
C also provides T with the FQDN of the intended server S and the identifier
of the application protocol, and T uses them to construct NAF-Id. T derives a
application-specific session key SK as (step 2):
SK = KDF(MK ,GBAvariant,RAND , IMPI,NAF -Id).
Note that SK is not specific to U, and cannot be used to authenticate U to S .
However, SK is specific to S.
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After derivation of SK, T uses U ’s password pw (which must be input by U
at some point) to compute an authenticator otp as a function f of SK and pw
(step 3), i.e.
otp = f(SK , pw).
The function f can be implemented in many ways. One possibility is to instan-
tiate f using HMAC [5] based on a suitable cryptographic hash function. That
is, otp could be computed as:
otp = HMACSK (pw).
After computation of otp, T deletes MK, SK, pw and other relevant parameters.
The server authenticates the user U by asking him or her to submit the values
username, B-TID, and otp over the channel between the client and the server
(step 4). Note that the user is not required to enter these values into the client,
since they can be transferred electronically from T to C . To verify the received
otp, S forwards the received B-TID and its own identifier NAF-Id to T ’s home
network and receives back the same SK as available to T, the lifetime of SK, and
other relevant information using the GAA bootstrapping key usage procedure
(step 5). As discussed previously, otp is valid only if it is computed using a valid
session key SK . The scheme requires that SK has a short validity period, and
its lifetime must be set to be the same as for MK, that is [Tstart, Tend]. Before
recomputing otp, S must check whether or not SK is valid. This is achieved by
checking whether or not the current system time of S (i.e. Tcurrent) is within the
period [Tstart, Tend]. If not, SK is invalid and U will be rejected; otherwise, S can
now use the received SK to recompute otp for verification. If the computed otp
and the otp submitted by U match, U will be granted access (step 6). Note that
we assume that the system time of the network and the server are synchronised
with each other. Thus, if the lifetime of SK is chosen to be sufficiently short
then the scheme gains the one-time property.
We observe that we can also arrange for otp to be valid for only one authenti-
cation session. To achieve this, S must check whether or not the received B-TID
has been used previously. If not, the corresponding SK is valid. Note that this
requires S to cache all the B-TID values it encounters.
4 Advantages and Limitations
Unlike previously proposed OTP schemes, the system does not require an initiali-
sation process. That is, the GAA-enabled mobile device is neither user nor server
specific, and can be used in the protocol with no registration or configuration
(except for the installation of the necessary application software). This approach
thus fits well to the multi-institution scenario. The system enables server-specific
session keys to be generated using a single GAA-enabled device, where each such
key can be used to help authenticate a user to the appropriate GAA-aware server.
The GAA-enabled device thus acts as a non-institution-specific authentication
token.
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To implement the scheme, the user only needs a GAA-enabled device with
a display and an input capability. This could be a 3G mobile phone with a
valid subscription, and there are a very large number of subscription holders
across the world. The approach thus has good scalability. Moreover, since a GAA
bootstrapped session key is used in the computation of the authenticator, there
is no need to generate and securely distribute a key-bearing token to every user.
The scheme can be implemented and deployed as a standard GAA-based OTP
system to enable the provision of ubiquitous and on-demand one-time password
services.
However, in deciding whether to use this one-time password service, the server
S must trust the mobile network provider not to compromise its long-term pass-
word by intercepting client-server communications and performing a brute force
search (see also section 5). Such a trust relationship could be supported by a
contractual agreement.
Finally, use of the scheme will incur the cost of using the GAA service.
However, challenge-based and counter-based OTP schemes can be devised which
reduce the use of GAA. In such a scheme, the GAA bootstrapped session keys
are used for multiple login sessions, and hence, GAA bootstrapping is not needed
for every login attempt. These schemes are more efficient and cost-effective, but
require the management of GAA bootstrapped session keys.
5 Informal Security Analysis
The GAA-enabled user device must be trusted by the user, since it has access
to the user’s long-term password. We also assume that the information within
the user device is protected against attack by an untrustworthy or compromised
client platform. As discussed in Holtmanns et al. [4], it is an implicit assumption
in any application of GAA that learning the subscriber key and/or MK by
attacking UMTS AKA is not possible. Another assumption is that a secure
authenticated channel between the server and the network has been set up by
some means, which implies that the network has the means to authenticate the
requester against the FQDN. As a result, an adversary can neither obtain SK
by monitoring the link between S and TTP nor request the SK intended for
S from TTP, since the adversary cannot claim ownership of the FQDN for this
SK.
However, even if an the machine hosting the client C has been compromised,
e.g. via installation of a keylogger, an adversary cannot re-use a captured otp, or
use it to obtain the user’s long term password. Re-use is prevented by the fact
that, as stated in section 3, otp is only valid for a short time period. Also, otp is
computed using a keyed one way hash function with a strong cryptographic key
(the GAA bootstrapped session key); it is thus infeasible to retrieve pw from
otp without knowing this session key. That is, A cannot succeed in an off-line
dictionary attack against pw without knowing the corresponding SK or MK
(using MK, A can derive SK ).
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The best strategy for A is to mount an on-line dictionary attack against pw.
In such an attack, A guesses pw and uses a GAA-enabled phone to engage in the
protocol (masquerading as the user) to test whether this single guess is correct
or not. However, to defeat such an attack, S can choose to lock out a user after
a fixed number of failed authentication attempts.
It is very important to note that TTP possesses the GAA bootstrapped
session keys and must be trusted since, if it intercepts the authenticator, it
could perform a dictionary attack to find the user’s long-term password.
Note that the GAA bootstrapping keys and the user password should be
deleted from the mobile device after the computation of otp. Moreover, one-time
passwords are consumed on demand, and thus the only secret that needs to be
securely managed is the user’s long-term password, which is known only by the
user and the server.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed a scheme that converts a password authentication mechanism
to a one-time password system using GAA. Most importantly, the GAA-enabled
device is neither user nor server specific, and can be used in the protocol with
no registration or configuration. An informal analysis shows that the scheme is
effective, secure, scalable and fits well to the multi-institution scenario. Hence,
the scheme can be implemented and deployed as a standard GAA-based OTP
system to enable the provision of ubiquitous and on-demand one-time password
services.
We conclude by observing that the role of the GAA infrastructure in the
novel scheme could be replaced by any other pre-existing security infrastructure
(e.g. a Trusted Platform, in which Trusted Platform Module uses its certified
public key pair), as long as the security infrastructure service provider is trusted
not to compromise individual user passwords.
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